We as Pakistanis should be in awe of the fact that
Much before General Stanley McChrystal had resigned, ‘Obama’s Third Surge’ had already petered into nothingness. The operations failed to create intended effects in a highly destabilized, charged and violent region. McChrystal, the highly decorated specialist in covert operations and assassination squads of the secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) may have been brilliant and brutal tactical hit man, but a strategic failure nonetheless.
His resignation has come as no surprise to analysts following the tug of war between the US Defence and Political Establishment and how the third surge was identically conducted at the heels of the failed second surge. In both failed operations, CENTCOM conspicuously avoided Kandhar but why?
In my article, ‘The Wilting Obama Surge’ in the Nation, I had identified the fault lines within the
It was indeed at the heels of this failure that
This change of heart also caused a furore amongst the ‘Shock and Awe’ rightist who singled out
Writing on Obama’s Third Surge, I had cautioned,
“The new AF-PAK strategy is a compromise with enough blank space for narratives to be filled later. It is these blank narratives that cause concern… What lies undisclosed is high intensity sting and covert intelligence operations conducted by CIA and the dreaded JSOC. The message is unambiguous.
As an analyst, my biggest concern is to identify the blank spaces in the narratives that need to be filled in after the change of command in
Much is also being made of the COIN Strategy cited as success in
Premised on ‘money talks’ all future operations in AF- PAK will witness a surge of monetary kickbacks as a corner stone to other factors related to combat, overt and covert violence, expanded role of drones (settled urban areas) and terrorising tactics in urban areas. A failing Pakistani economy is mandatory to the success of this strategy.
It is with this reason that my last ten articles on these pages have primarily focussed on the intrinsic link between the war in
Though the modality and command may have changed, we Pakistanis must realise that the American long, mid and short term designs and objectives in the region have not. This should also dispel any illusions that some Pakistanis may have on the benefits of the Pakistan-US Equation as a saviour.
We should rather be in awe of the fact that
Under the new command, the next phase of US operations is not likely to commence before September 2010. This also coincides with the time when
As an appropriate measure, the nation must agree to eat grass, least for the survival of its crowned jewels rather for its own national honour and pride.
If this preparation does not take place before the new surge, Pakistanis will have no option left but to look for a new social contract.
I pray it comes peacefully and not through violence.